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The aim of this bachelor’s thesis was to study the requirements set for security 
auditing of mobile devices by Common Criteria, to determine how the current 
system fulfills these requirements and to make the needed modifications to fulfill 
the requirements. This thesis was commissioned by Bittium Oyj. 
 
The requirements set for the security auditing for the mobile devices were stud-
ied and a list of all the requirements that needed to be fulfilled were composed. 
After the requirements were clear, the actual logging system of Android was 
studied to understand how it has been implemented. The logging system was 
studied very thoroughly to get the complete picture on how it functions at differ-
ent levels of the system and how it is currently being utilized in the Android plat-
form. 
 
After the Android logging system has been presented, a few solutions on how 
audit logging functionality could be implemented and integrated as a part of the 
Android logging system are presented. 
 
The actual analysis of the system was the last part of this thesis. Analyzing cer-
tain components of the system took a significant amount of time as they were 
very complex, but understanding their operation and functionality was crucial for 
making a proper analysis. The analysis itself was a surprisingly demanding 
work, as I had to cover a lot of individual components and had to learn how they 
function in a very short time. 
 
As was found during the analysis, some requirements were not initially met, but 
after making the necessary modifications to the responsible components, most 
of the requirements were met in the end. Due to time restrictions set at the be-
ginning of this thesis, some of the requirements were identified to require a 
great effort to make the necessary modifications and therefore, they were left 
out of the scope of the implementation part of this thesis. 
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VOCABULARY 
CCRA  Common Criteria Recognition Agreement 
API  Application Programming Interface 
ART  Android Runtime 
DVM  Dalvik Virtual Machine 
SELinux   Security-Enhanced Linux 
ADB  Android Debug Bridge 
MDM  Mobile Device Management 
HAL  Hardware Abstraction Layer 
DEK  Data Encryption Key 
KEK  Key Encryption Key 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The objective for this thesis was planned together with Bittium Oyj. 
Bittium Oyj was branched out of Elektrobit Oyj in 2015, after the company sold 
its automotive related business activities and the rights to the Elektrobit brand 
name. Elektrobit Oyj was originally founded in 1985. (1.) 
Bittium employed a little over 600 people in 5 countries at the end of 2017. The 
majority of the employees is spread across 5 offices located in Finland. (1.) 
Bittium specializes in developing reliable and secure communication solutions 
and equipment. In addition, Bittium provides medical technology solutions for 
bio signal measuring and high-quality information security solutions for mobile 
devices and computers. (1.) 
Bittium additionally provides consulting and R&D services for external parties. 
(1.) 
The primary aim that was set for this thesis was to familiarize with the Common 
Criteria security audit requirements for mobile devices, to analyze the current 
Android system and its compatibility with the requirements. Then if necessary, 
to implement the needed changes to comply with the Common Criteria security 
requirements. 
The system that was analyzed is an undisclosed mobile device using the ver-
sion 8.1 of Android. Further details about the system will not be presented in 
this thesis due to the proprietary and secret nature of the information. This is 
also the reason why very little inner details are revealed from proprietary com-
ponents and certain implementation details.  
If implementation modifications were necessary to fulfill the requirements, the 
implementations that were made were small scale modifications. As the time 
was very limited and it was necessary to learn the system, bigger scale modifi-
cations or complete overhauls of the components were not made. 
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The Common Criteria organization is introduced at the beginning of the docu-
ment along with Protection Profiles, which are created and maintained by the 
Common Criteria organization. 
After the introduction of the general format of the Protection Profile, a deeper 
look is taken into the Mobile Device Fundamentals Protection Profile, which is 
the applicable Protection Profile for this thesis. 
The Mobile Device Fundamentals Protection Profile is analyzed and the appli-
cable security requirements are composed together into this document to help 
the reader get a better understanding of the overall requirements and their 
meaning.  
The Android logging system is presented in great detail as understanding the 
inner workings of the logging system and how the logging system is utilized at 
different levels was crucial for analyzing the system and its logging capabilities. 
The Android logging system consists of many different levels of operation and 
many different components that together form the overall logging system. All of 
these individual components are presented during the coverage of the system 
and their purpose and certain implementation details are presented. 
A few components that are not directly related to the logging system are also 
presented together with the logging system. Although they are not directly part 
of the logging system, these components are used to interact with the logging 
system in various ways. 
After the logging system is covered, a few different solutions for implementing 
audit logging for the Android platform and integrating it as a part of the Android 
logging system are presented. 
The final chapter covers the actual analysis of the system and presents the re-
sults of the analysis. In this chapter, the system will be analyzed by one security 
requirement at a time with implementation modifications being presented to 
some extent, depending on the component being analyzed. 
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2 COMMON CRITERIA 
Common Criteria and the accompanying Common Methodology for Information 
Technology Security Evaluation are a technical basis for an international 
agreement, the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement (CCRA). (2.) 
The purpose of this arrangement is to ensure that individual products are evalu-
ated by competent and neutral licensed laboratories. These laboratories deter-
mine on what level the product fulfills the security properties that have been set 
by the Common Criteria. Fulfilling the security requirements set by the Common 
Criteria grants the evaluated product a certificate that is issued by one of the 
many Certificate Authorizing Schemes. (2.) 
The Certificate Authorizing Schemes are government bodies that are responsi-
ble for IT security certification in their respective countries. The Certificate Au-
thorizing Schemes only reside in the countries that are Certificate Authorizing 
Members of the CCRA. The licensed laboratories mentioned above also reside 
in the countries that are Certificate Authorizing Members of the CCRA. 
Section 2.2 covers all of the member countries and their role in the CCRA. 
2.1 Purpose of the Common Criteria 
The main purpose of the Common Criteria is to ensure the quality and high 
standards of evaluation for Information Technology products and their respec-
tive protection profiles. The evaluations themselves are also expected to con-
tribute to the confidence in the security of the products and their protection pro-
files. (3.) 
The secondary purposes are to improve the availability of evaluated and securi-
ty enhanced Information Technology products and their protection profiles, re-
duce duplicate evaluations of Information Technology products and their protec-
tion profiles and to improve the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of the evalua-
tion and the certification processes. (3.) 
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2.2 CCRA members 
The participants in the CCRA are government organizations or agencies that 
represent their respective countries. The members can be divided into two cat-
egories: producers of Evaluation certificates and consumers of Evaluation certif-
icates. If a member country is a producer of Evaluation certificates, they of 
course can also participate in consuming the Evaluation certificates. On the 
other hand, if a member country is only a consumer of Evaluation certificates, 
they may not maintain an IT security Evaluation capability and therefore cannot 
produce Evaluation certificates. (4, p. 6) 
Below are two tables of the CCRA member countries. Table 1 contains the 
member countries that produce Evaluation certificates. Table 2 contains the 
member countries that consume Evaluation certificates. 
TABLE 1. Evaluation certificate producing CCRA members (5.) 
Australia Australasian Information Security Evaluation program (AISEP) 
 
 
Canada Communications Security Establishment (CSE) 
France Agence Nationale de la Sécurité des Systèmes d’Information (ANSSI) 
Germany Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI) 
India Indian Common Criteria Certification Scheme 
Italy Organismo di Certificazione della Sicurezza Informatica (OCSI) 
Japan Japan IT Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme (JISEC) 
Malaysia CyberSecurity Malaysia 
Netherlands The Netherlands scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security (NSCIB) 
 
New Zealand Defence Signals Directorate (DSC) 
Norway SERTIT 
Republic of Korea IT Security Certification Center (ITSCC) 
Spain Organismo de Certificación de la Seguridad de las Tecnologías de la Información 
Sweden Swedish Certification Body for IT Security (CSEC) 
Turkey Turkish Standards Institution (TSE) 
United Kingdom UK IT Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme (NCSC) 
United States National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) 
TABLE 2. Evaluation certificate consuming CCRA members (5.) 
Austria Federal Chancellery of Austria 
Czech Republic National Security Authority of the Czech Republic (NBU) 
Denmark Center for Cyber Security (CFCS) 
Ethiopia Information Network Security Agency (INSA) 
Finland Finnish Communications Regulatory Authority (FICORA) 
Greece National Intelligence Service (NIS) 
Hungary Ministry of National Development 
Israel The Standards Institution of Israel (SII) 
Pakistan Ministry of Defence  
Qatar Ministry of Transport and Communications (MOTC) 
Singapore Cyber Security Agency of Singapore (CSA) 
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2.3 Protection profiles 
The Protection Profiles, which were mentioned previously, are documents that 
contain the specific requirements a product must fulfill in order to be qualified for 
the Common Criteria certification. The protection profiles also contain test cases 
assuring that the security requirements are met. The overall structure of the pro-
tection profiles is presented in more depth in the next subsections. 
The protection profiles are defined based on the target product’s category. The 
categories range from printer software to whole operating systems. 
The full list of currently approved protection profiles can be found from the link 
in the references. (6.) 
2.3.1 Structure of a protection profile 
The main part of the protection profile consists of three main chapters: Security 
Problem Definition, Security Objectives and Security Requirements. 
The overall structure of the Protection Profiles may differ based on the target 
category, but the main chapters are always present in the Protection Profiles. 
Each of the chapters is covered in more detail in the upcoming subsections. 
Protection Profile for Mobile Device Fundamentals, the version 3.1 is used for 
the examples as it was the relevant Protection Profile for this thesis and it was 
the latest available Protection Profile for the Mobile Device category. (7.) 
In addition to the previously mentioned chapters of the Protection Profile, the 
Mobile Device Fundamentals Protection Profile also contains documentation on 
the design of proper entropy, use case templates and other relevant documen-
tation which are specific to the Mobile Device category. Other categories might 
contain similar documentation on information that is relevant to the category. 
These specific chapters are not covered here, as they were not relevant for the 
completion of this thesis. 
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2.3.1.1 Security problem definition 
The security problem definition chapter contains information about possible 
threats that the target product may face, conditions that are assumed as the 
normal operating conditions for the target product and other possible organiza-
tional security policies for the target product. 
The threats that are defined are possible cases on how the target product and 
its operations could be compromised. 
 
FIGURE 1. Threat defined in a Protection Profile (7, p. 14) 
The assumptions are the assumed normal operating conditions of the target 
product. These can vary depending on the target product and its category. 
 
FIGURE 2. Assumptions defined in a Protection Profile (7, p. 15) 
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2.3.1.2 Security objectives 
Security objectives that have been defined are defined as such that they will 
counter the corresponding threats that were defined in the Security Problem 
Definition chapter. 
Each of the security objectives are divided into smaller security requirements. 
Once the individual security requirements are all addressed, the security objec-
tive can be assumed to be capable of preventing the corresponding threats. 
The security objective also contains a written description on how it addresses 
the corresponding threats. 
 
FIGURE 3. Security objective in a Protection Profile (7, p. 16) 
The security objectives chapter also contains objectives for the assumptions 
mentioned earlier. These objectives are mainly for setting the correct operation-
al environment for the target product. 
 
FIGURE 4. Objectives for Operational Environment in a Protection Profile (7, p. 
17-18) 
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The final part of the security objectives chapter is a security objectives rationale. 
This section is used to demonstrate how all of the above-mentioned threats, 
assumptions and organizational security policies relate to the security objec-
tives. 
The purpose of this segment is to rationalize how the security objectives coun-
ter the targeted threat. The segment contains a specific written description of 
the relation of objective and threat. 
 
FIGURE 5. Threat rationale in a Protection Profile (7, p. 18) 
The first column contains the threat or an assumption. The second column con-
tains the security objectives which, when completed, will counter the relevant 
threat or realize the assumption. The last column contains the written rationale. 
The security objectives rationale also contains the rationalization on how the 
certain security objectives realize the assumptions that were set in the security 
problem definition section of the document. 
An example of the rationalization of these assumptions can be found in figure 6 
below. 
 
FIGURE 6. Assumption rationale in a Protection Profile (7, p. 19) 
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2.3.1.3 Security requirements 
Security requirements are the individual security features that the target product 
has to implement in order to qualify for certification. 
All security requirements are sorted under specific classes. Below in figure 7 is 
an example of a class for security audit related security requirements. All indi-
vidual security requirements share the same identifier as the base class. The 
identifier is specified in the brackets after the class name. 
  
FIGURE 7. Security requirement class in a Protection Profile (7, p. 20) 
The security requirements themselves can also be divided into smaller separate 
requirements. These small separate requirements are related to each other and 
supplement each other to fulfill the main security requirement. 
Each security requirement also contains an Assurance Activity. This is used to 
determine how to verify the functionality and to be assured that the security re-
quirement is met. The Assurance Activity contains very specific test steps on 
how the verification of the security requirement is to be done. 
 
FIGURE 8. Security requirement in a Protection Profile (7, p. 27) 
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2.4 Certified products 
The Common Criteria organization has a list of products that have been certified 
and are compliant with either of the following conditions: 
The product is compliant with a collaborative Protection Profile that has been 
developed and maintained in accordance with CCRA Annex K (4, p. 46) with a 
selected Evaluation Assurance level (EAL) of at least 4, including flaw remedia-
tion (ALC_FLR). (7.)  
The product is compliant with the EAL levels of 1 and 2, including the flaw re-
mediation. (7.) 
The Evaluation Assurance Levels are covered in great detail in part 3 of the cur-
rently latest Common Criteria release. (9, chapter 8.) 
The flaw remediation is also covered in part 3 of the currently latest Common 
Criteria release (9, section 15.5.) 
The certified products themselves cover a lot of different categories. A list of the 
key categories can be seen in figure 9 below. 
After 1st of June 2019, products that have an expired certificate will be moved to 
an Archive list that is also available on the CCRA portal. (8.) 
 
FIGURE 9. List of Common Criteria product categories (8.) 
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2.4.1 Example certified product 
Figure 10 below contains an example of a certified product found in the Com-
mon Criteria Certified Products list.  
 
FIGURE 10. Certified product found in the Common Criteria Certified Products 
list (8.) 
The product listing itself contains the name of the product and the vendor of the 
product. In this case the product is Apple’s iOS 11 operating system. In addi-
tion, the listing contains the product certificate itself, the date it was issued and 
the date it will expire. The actual certificate can be seen in figure 11 below. 
There is also a mention about the compliance that was met to be qualified for 
the certification. In this case the product was compliant with the relevant Protec-
tion Profiles. The scheme, which granted the certificate, is also listed. 
And lastly below the product’s name are all the relevant references to files such 
as the Protection Profiles that were used for the compliance validation. 
 
FIGURE 11. Apple iOS 11 Common Criteria certificate (8.) 
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3 SECURITY AUDIT REQUIREMENTS 
This chapter will present all of the individual security requirements that need to 
be implemented to cover the Security Audit requirements of the Protection Pro-
file. 
The Protection Profile, which is used for determining the requirements, is the 
Protection Profile for Mobile Device Fundamentals, Version 3.1. (7.) 
In certain security requirements, the Protection Profile provides a possibility to 
select from a limited number of implementation options. An example of this kind 
of selection can be seen in figure 12 below. 
 
FIGURE 12. Selection in a Protection Profile security requirement. (7, p. 22) 
In this case the selection is whether or not to implement audit recording for the 
event in which the wipe of protected data fails. 
Both options are as valid as the other and the choice will not affect the valida-
tion of the product or the possibility of certification. 
For the safety of the product it would, of course, be better to include the auditing 
of as much of security related events as possible, but it is not always viable or 
even possible in some cases to include all the relevant events. 
Due to strict time constraints of this thesis, during these kinds of selections 
where it was possible to decide whether or not to implement certain functionali-
ty, it was decided not to implement the functionality. 
Regardless of the selection choices made during this thesis, it is possible to 
include the auditing for more of the events at a later date. 
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3.1 Audit Data Generation – FAU_GEN.1 
This security requirement defines requirements for the generation of audit data 
and the specific format in which the audit data is to be recorded in the audit rec-
ords. 
3.1.1 FAU_GEN.1.1 
This requirement defines events during which the security functionality should 
generate an audit record of the event. 
Below is a compiled list of all the events that the security functionalities will 
need to be able to audit in order to fulfill the security requirement.  
The requirement required referencing other sections of the Protection Profile for 
locating certain auditable events, all of which have also been included in the list. 
This was done to help the reader better understand the overall requirements 
and to remove the need for the user to study the actual Protection Profile. 
Compiled list of auditable events required by the security requirement: 
1. Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions (7, p. 20) 
 Audit record will be generated at the start-up and the shutdown of 
the audit functionalities 
 
2. All administrative actions (7, p. 20) 
 An audit record will be generated in the event of an applicable 
administrative action 
 Applicable administrative actions: (7, p. 93) 
 Configuring of password policy 
 Configuring of session locking policy 
 Configuring of application installation policy 
 
3. Start-up and shutdown of the Rich OS (7, p. 20) 
 An audit record will be generated at the start-up and the shutdown 
of the Android operating system (Rich OS) 
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4. Insertion or removal of removable media (7, p. 20) 
 If the target supports external removable media, an audit record 
will be generated in the event of insertion or removal of that media 
 
5. Specifically defined auditable events (7, p. 20) 
 An audit record will be generated in cases of specifically defined 
auditable events 
 List of the defined auditable events can be found in table 3 
 
6. Audit records reaching certain percentage of the audit capacity (7, p. 20) 
 An audit record will be generated in the event that the audit rec-
ords are reaching a set threshold of the full capacity. 
 
7. Specifically defined optional auditable events (7, p. 20) 
 An audit record will be generated in cases of specifically defined 
optional auditable events 
 List of the included optional auditable events can be found in table 
4 
TABLE 3. Compiled list of the specifically defined auditable events (7, p. 22-23) 
Requirement Auditable event Additional information 
 
FCS_STG_EXT.1 Import or destruction of key Identity of key, Role and identity of requestor 
 
 
FCS_STG_EXT.3 Failure to verify integrity of stored key Identity of key being verified 
 
FDP_DAR_EXT.2 Failure to encrypt / decrypt data No additional information 
FDP_STG_EXT.1 Addition or removal of certificate from 
Trust Anchor Database 
 
Subject name of certificate 
FIA_X509_EXT.1 Failure to validate X.509v3 certificate Reason for failure of validation 
FPT_TST_EXT.1 Initiation / Failure of self-test No additional information 
FPT_TXT_EXT.2 Start-up of the target product No additional information 
TABLE 4. Compiled list of included optional auditable events (7, p. 23-26 ) 
Requirement Auditable event Additional information 
 
FAU_SEL.1 Modifications to audit configuration 
while audit collection is operating 
 
No additional information 
 FMT_SMF_EXT.1 Initiation of application installation or 
update 
Name and version of application 
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3.1.2 FAU_GEN.1.2 
This requirement defines how the data from the auditable events listed in the 
previous subsection is to be stored in the audit records. 
Each event that is stored into the audit records needs to contain at least the 
following information: (7, p. 20-21) 
 Date and time of the event 
 Type of the event 
 Type of event is indicated by the severity level of the event 
 Severity levels: “Info”, “Warning” or “Error” 
 Subject identity 
 Process name or the process ID 
 Other unique identifier 
 Outcome of the event 
 Indicating whether the event was a success or a failure 
 Additional information 
 Additional information is required in the case that the event is one 
of the specifically defined auditable events in Table 3 or one of the 
optional auditable events in Table 4. 
 
3.2 Audit Storage Protection – FAU_STG.1 
This requirement states that the security functionality should be able to protect 
the stored audit records from unauthorized deletion. The requirement also 
states that the security functionality will be able to prevent unauthorized modifi-
cations of the audit records. (7, p. 27) 
3.3 Prevention of Audit Data Loss – FAU_STG.4 
This requirement states that the security functionality should overwrite the old-
est audit record if the full capacity of the audit records is reached. (7, p. 27) 
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3.4 Audit Review – FAU_SAR.1 
This security requirement is currently optional and is not required to be fulfilled 
but is expected to be included as soon as possible and may become mandatory 
in the future. (7, p. 145) 
As it is possible to include the required functionality, it should be included so 
that it will not have to be included separately in the future. 
The requirement states that the security functionality should provide an adminis-
trator the capability to read all auditable events from the audit records. This ac-
cess to audit records can be for example granted through an API or via a Mobile 
Device Management (MDM) agent. (7, p. 145) 
The audit records should also be provided in a manner that is suitable for the 
administrator to interpret. (7, p. 145) 
The requirement, however, does not set any assumptions on the knowledge or 
expertise level of the administrator interpreting the audit records. Taking this 
into consideration, the audit records should be kept as simple as possible and 
they should not include any technical information that would require extensive 
knowledge or expertise of the subject. 
3.5 Selective Audit – FAU_SEL.1 
This security requirement is also optional similar to the previous one, which de-
fined requirements for audit record reviewing.  
The requirement states that the security functionality should be able to select a 
subset of events to be audited from the all of the auditable events. This should 
be achieved by selecting the auditable events based on the following attributes: 
(7, p. 145) 
1. Event type 
2. Success of auditable events 
3. Failure of auditable events 
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4 ANDROID LOGGING SYSTEM 
This chapter will present Android’s logging system and the individual compo-
nents that are involved. The chapter will also present certain relevant implemen-
tation details from some of the logging system’s key components. 
The logging system is covered starting from the perspective of a traditional Java 
and a native application all the way down to the core of the whole logging sys-
tem, which is the Logd logging daemon. 
This chapter will also cover Android’s log viewing tool Logcat and the communi-
cation method between an Android device and a host PC. 
An overview of the whole Android logging system can be found below in figure 
13. This overview will be referenced multiple times in the upcoming sections 
and it is shortly explained below. 
The components of the Android logging system are presented in unique colors 
to help better understand the hierarchy of the system. The components sharing 
the same color are part of the same structure. 
 
FIGURE 13. Overview of the Android Logging System 
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4.1 Java application 
Traditional Java applications run under the Android operating system and within 
an Android Runtime (ART) environment. ART has replaced the previously used 
Dalvik Virtual Machine (DVM) in the Android platform. ART is used to translate 
Dalvik bytecode, previously used by DVM, into native instructions. Dalvik 
bytecode in turn is translated from Java bytecode, which in turn is compiled 
from the Java files of the application. (10.) 
Topics, such as how Android handles its applications, how Java code is com-
piled into Java bytecode and converted into Dalvik bytecode, or how the Dalvik 
bytecode is translated into native instructions by ART, are beyond the scope of 
this thesis. 
At the application level the logging system can be easily utilized by using An-
droid’s logging APIs for sending log messages. Android currently provides four 
separate logging APIs for logging messages. 
The reason for the existence of four separate APIs is due to the implementation 
of the underlying logging system. The logging system has five separate buffers 
for different kinds of log events. The five main buffers are: main, radio, event, 
system and crash buffers. These buffers are managed by the Logd logging 
daemon, which was shown in figure 13 at the beginning of this chapter. The 
logging daemon will be presented on its own later in section 4.3. 
The four APIs, which Android offers, are used to log message to the main, ra-
dio, event and system buffers.  
There is a way to log messages to the crash buffer but as Android has no men-
tioning of it in its documentation, it is most likely not officially supported and 
therefore not presented.  
Java also offers an API for logging, but as the use of Android’s logging APIs is 
preferred over the use of Java’s API, the Java API is not presented in further 
detail. For potential further future study, the documentation on the Java API can 
be found from the references. (11.) 
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The buffer names themselves are a good indication of the type of log messages 
they are mainly used to store: 
 Main buffer 
 Logging messages sent by normal applications 
 System buffer  
 Logging messages sent by Android’s system services 
 Radio buffer 
  Logging of radio and telephony related messages 
 Event buffer 
 Logging of system diagnostic events (12.) 
 Crash buffer 
 Logging of crash events and stack traces 
Although Android offers multiple separate API’s, which can be used, the actual 
implementation of, different APIs is very similar to one and another when disre-
garding a few exceptions. 
The system and radio logging classes are mostly wrappers for the base Log 
class. The base Log class in question here is the main logging API, which is 
used for normal applications to log messages to the main buffer. 
The base Log class contains definitions of identification numbers for each of the 
five different buffers mentioned earlier. The wrapper implementations then ref-
erence the appropriate identification number. The logging system uses these 
identification numbers to select the appropriate buffer for the log messages. 
 
FIGURE 14. Android Log.java log buffer identification numbers (13.) 
The implementation for the EventLog class is a bit more complex than the im-
plementation of the radio and the system logging classes. 
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This is mainly because the event buffer stores the messages in a binary format 
instead of the normal text message format which the other buffers use. (14.) 
The actual use of the four APIs corresponding with the target buffers is straight 
forward. The APIs can be utilized by importing the appropriate classes. The im-
port of these classes can be seen in figure 15 below. 
 
FIGURE 15. Importing of Android’s logging classes 
The most relevant of these logging classes is the base Log class. The rest are 
used under very specific circumstances and some are not even meant to be 
used for standard applications and are made to be used by device manufactur-
ers for logging of Android system services. 
As this subsection is about logging from a standard application, the focus is on 
the base logging class. 
After importing the main logging class, it can be easily used by calling the class 
methods for sending log messages. The class contains methods for several 
different severities of log events. This can be seen in figure 16 below. 
The different severity levels are: ERROR, WARN, INFO, DEBUG and VER-
BOSE. (15.) 
 
FIGURE 16. Android main Log class methods used for sending log messages 
The tag parameter is used to identify the source of the log message. The mes-
sage parameter is the message that is logged. (15.) 
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4.2 Native application 
The difference between a Java application and a Native application on Android 
is that the native application is running natively as the name suggests. Running 
natively means that the application is written in native programming languages, 
such as C/C++, which is then compiled straight into machine code whereas Ja-
va code is compiled into Java bytecode, then converted into Dalvik bytecode 
and then finally translated into native instructions. 
 
There are both advantages and disadvantages to writing a native application 
over a Java application. 
 
The main advantage of writing a native application over a Java application is the 
boost in the performance of the application. As the application is running native-
ly on the processor instead of being translated into native instructions from the 
Dalvik bytecode, the removal of this translation process provides a performance 
boost to the application. 
 
Another big advantage is the ability to manually manage the application’s 
memory. Native programming languages provide support for manually allocat-
ing and deallocating memory for the application. On Java this kind of memory 
manipulation is not possible as Java uses automatic memory management. 
 
The manual memory manipulation can also be a disadvantage. If the memory is 
managed incorrectly, the application can become vulnerable to external threats 
and cause further security threats to the whole system. This problem is non-
existent in Java as the programmer has no manual control over the memory 
and the human error in memory management is not possible. 
 
In the right hands the manual memory management provided with native pro-
gramming languages is an advantage as it increases the efficiency of the 
memory handling and in turn the performance of the application. Using native 
languages also reduces the overall memory footprint of the application. 
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As mentioned previously, writing native applications does not come without any 
drawbacks. 
 
When writing native applications, the applications need to be compiled for mul-
tiple different processor architectures, as there are various Android devices 
running with multiple different processor architectures. All of the different ver-
sions need to be included in the Android Application Package (APK) that the 
user installs on the Android device. This will of course increase the overall size 
of the APK. 
 
Another drawback of using native languages over Java is that Android does not 
provide access to all the same APIs that Java has access to. This can be a deal 
breaker for certain kinds of applications that need to be able to access APIs that 
are only available for Java applications. 
 
Usual cases when native applications are written over Java applications are 
performance demanding applications, such as games or physics-based applica-
tions, as using native languages provides access to various high-performance 
libraries such, as OpenGL or Vulkan.  
 
The logging library used on the native level of the Android platform is the Liblog 
library. 
The Liblog library can be taken into use by including the library header and link-
ing the dynamic logging library during the compilation of the application. 
 
FIGURE 17. Linking the Liblog library (16.) 
 
FIGURE 18. Liblog logging to main buffer 
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The macros in the figure 18 above are for logging to the main buffer. The in-
cluded header does not provide functionality for logging to other buffers besides 
the main buffer. In order to log to the other buffers in the logging system, a dif-
ferent header of the Liblog library needs to be included. The header in question 
can be seen in figure 19 below. 
 
FIGURE 19. Liblog logging to multiple buffers 
The library has predefined macros for logging to the previously presented buff-
ers. The library uses the user defined LOG_TAG as the tag for the log mes-
sage. The severity level is set automatically based on the used macro. 
The ALOGV, ALOGD, e.g. macros use the same logging functionality, but with 
different severity levels. The severity is set in the macro definition, as can be 
seen in figure 20 below. In this case the severity level is set to LOG_DEBUG. 
The first letter of the macro indicates the target buffer in question: ALOG for 
main buffer, SLOG for system buffer and RLOG for radio buffer. The last letter 
indicates the severity level. Logging to the event buffer has its own separate 
macros: LOG_EVENT_INT and LOG_EVENT_LONG. 
 
FIGURE 20. Liblog implementation of ALOGD macro (17.) 
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4.3 Logd logging daemon 
As was shown earlier in figure 13, Logd is the core of the whole Android logging 
system. 
Logd is a logging daemon that ultimately handles all of the incoming log mes-
sages and stores them in their respective buffers. The logging daemon is a ser-
vice that runs in Linux user space. 
 
Current implementation of the logging daemon has five buffers for different cat-
egories of log messages. These buffers were introduced earlier in the previous 
sections where the logging at the application level was presented. 
 
The logging daemon creates three sockets at the start of its program. These 
sockets are used to receive logs, transfer the contents of the log buffers and to 
provide a control interface for the daemon itself. The logging daemon also inter-
acts with multiple other interfaces and sockets but as they are not created by 
the logging daemon, they exist independently of the logging daemon. 
 
The three sockets that are created by the logging daemon: 
- Socket for receiving logs from the Liblog library 
o /dev/socket/logdw/ 
- Socket for sending log buffer contents 
o /dev/socket/logdr/ 
- Socket for controlling the logging daemon itself 
o /dev/socket/logd/ 
 
The log messages, which are stored in the five main buffers, are received from 
the first of the created sockets: /dev/socket/logdw/. This socket is where the 
majority of the log messages come from, as all of the log messages that were 
sent by applications and Android’s system services are received through this 
socket. 
The Liblog library writes the logs it receives from the upper level Java APIs to 
this socket. The library also writes the logs that are logged at the native level, by 
the library itself, to this socket. 
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In addition to the five buffers mentioned earlier, the logging daemon also has 
support for a sixth optional buffer, which can be used to store kernel log mes-
sages. When kernel logging is enabled, the logging daemon reads kernel log 
messages from the kernel’s ring buffer through an interface in: /proc/kmsg/. 
 
Each individual buffer, which was mentioned earlier, has a certain capacity of 
how much data it can store. The buffers, which the logging daemon manages, 
are called ring buffers or circular buffers. This means that when the full capacity 
is reached, the oldest log messages are removed to make room for new log 
messages. The buffer can be thought of as a circle that is connected from one 
end to the other. 
 
By default, the size for each of the buffers is set at 256 kilobytes. The logging 
daemon also provides the possibility to manually configure the size of each 
buffer. The maximum size, which can be configured for an individual buffer, is 
restricted at 256 megabytes. 
 
In figure 21 below is an example of the buffer sizes. In the example, the buffers 
have been configured to a maximum size of 4 megabytes per buffer. 
 
When inspecting the buffer sizes, the logging daemon also reports the current 
status of each buffer. The status indicates the current consumption level of each 
buffer. With this information, the user can easily calculate the remaining free 
space in the buffers. 
 
 
FIGURE 21. Example of logging daemon buffer sizes 
The buffer sizes and their current status can be viewed using Logcat, as was 
done in the above figure. Logcat will be covered separately in the next section. 
The buffers can also be manually configured using Logcat. 
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The logging daemon also provides the possibility to store log messages of Se-
curity-Enhanced Linux (SELinux). 
 
SELinux is a Linux Security Module that is used to enforce mandatory access 
control over all running processes.  More information on SELinux, its concept 
and how it has been incorporated into Android can be found from the documen-
tation on Android Security. (18.) 
 
Log messages from SELinux are read through a Netlink socket using 
NETLINK_AUDIT protocol to access the audit logging subsystem of Linux. 
 
Netlink sockets are asynchronous sockets which are used for Inter-process 
communication (IPC) between kernel and user space processes. These sockets 
can also be used for IPC between user space processes but normal UNIX 
sockets are preferred to be used in this case. (19.) 
 
Netlink currently has support for multiple protocols, including the 
NETLINK_AUDIT protocol, which is used for reading the SELinux log messages 
from the kernel’s ring buffer. 
 
The Netlink sockets were first implemented to provide access to the network 
control plane of the Linux kernel from regular user-space programs. 
 
The log messages from SELinux can be stored in the main and the system 
buffers, depending on the configuration of the logging daemon. The logging 
daemon can also be configured to write the SELinux log messages back to the 
kernel’s ring buffer. The messages are written to a character device that be-
longs to the audit logging subsystem: /dev/kmsg/.  
 
The possibility to write the SELinux log messages back to the kernel’s ring buff-
er is provided, because when the logging daemon reads the SELinux log mes-
sages from the Netlink socket, they are removed from the kernel’s ring buffer.  
This provides the functionality to keep the SELinux log messages both in the 
logging daemons own buffers and the kernel’s ring buffer.  
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The contents of the log buffers can be read from another one of its created 
sockets: /dev/socket/logdr/. This socket is used by Logcat to receive the log 
buffer contents from the logging daemon. 
 
When reading logs from the above mentioned socket, the reader first needs to 
instruct the logging daemon with certain parameters to define the logs that the 
reader wants to receive from the logging daemon. The instructions are sent to 
the logging daemon using the same aforementioned socket. 
 
There are a total of six parameters from which the logging daemon determines 
to send the requested logs. Currently, only five of the six parameters are im-
plemented to be configurable. 
 
The parameters, their corresponding Logcat flags and their meaning can be 
seen in table 5 below. 
TABLE 5. Logging daemon log reading instruction parameters 
Parameter Logcat Flag Description 
 
tail=<value> -t, -T <count> Number of log lines to read. Selects the logs starting from the 
most recent one 
 
 
start=<value> -t, -T <time> Start time of logs to dump. Default is set to EPOCH time 
timeout=<value> - Feature not yet implemented 
lids=<value> -b <value> Log ID’s to send. This refers to the buffers from which the logs 
should be sent. 
pid=<value> --pid <value> Logs from specific process ID 
dumpAndClose -d Exit from the reader thread when log dumping is done 
 
The last of the three sockets, which the logging daemon controls, is the control 
interface for the logging daemon itself. The socket in question is: 
/dev/socket/logd. 
 
The logging daemon can be manually configured by sending certain commands 
to the command interface socket. Most of the manual configurations, which can 
be done to the logging daemon through the control interface, are for the buffers 
that the logging daemon manages.  
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The configuration parameters can be seen in table 6 below. 
TABLE 6. Logcat flags used to configure the logging daemon (20.) 
Logd command Logcat Flag Description 
 
Clear  -c, --clear   Clear the selected buffers and exit logcat. Default buffers are 
main, system and crash buffer. 
 
 
GetBufSize  
GetBufSizeUsed 
-g, --buffer-
size 
Print the size of the specified log buffer and exit logcat. De-
fault buffers are main, system and crash buffer. 
 SetBufSize -G <size> 
Set the size of the log buffer. Default buffers are main, sys-
tem and crash buffer. K or M can be added after the size to 
indicate kilo- or megabytes. 
GetStatistics -S  
 
Include statistics in the output, number of logs by UID, PID, 
TID, etc. 
GetPruneList  -p, --prune Read current white- and blacklists 
SetPruneList -P, --prune 
<list> 
Write new white- and blacklists 
 
The overall logging functionality of the logging daemon that has been presented 
in this section is visually demonstrated in figure 22 below. 
 
The figure contains all of the previously presented components, sockets and 
interfaces that interact with the logging daemon.  
 
 
FIGURE 22. Overview of the logging daemon and its interaction with various 
interfaces 
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4.4 Logcat command line tool 
Logcat is a command line tool that can be used to retrieve log messages which 
have been logged by the logging system. (20.) 
Logcat also acts as the control interface for the Logd logging daemon, which 
was presented in the previous section. 
Regardless of this, as was seen earlier in figure 13, Logcat is a completely sep-
arate program from the logging daemon. 
In order to use Logcat, an Android Debug Bridge (ADB) connection to the target 
device is required.  ADB is a versatile command line tool that provides function-
ality for a host PC to communicate with a target Android device. 
ADB will be covered separately in the next section. 
The Logcat tool can be utilized from an ADB client by issuing a logcat command 
and passing the arguments desired accompanied with the corresponding flags. 
In addition to using the logcat command directly from the ADB client, the com-
mand can be used after creating a shell connection to the device. The shell 
connection can be created by using a shell command in the ADB client as seen 
in figure 23 below. 
 
FIGURE 23. Creating shell connection with the target device (20.) 
By executing the shell command, the ADB client provides the user access to a 
UNIX shell that can be used to run various commands on the device. All of the 
standard UNIX commands are not necessarily available to be executed on the 
device, as the Android shell only contains a subset of the standard UNIX com-
mands. 
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As Logcat is mainly used for retrieving the contents of the logging daemons log 
buffers, Logcat provides extensive configurations on the formatting of its output 
and filtering of the actual log contents. 
An example of filtering Logcat output based on selected buffers can be seen in 
figure 24 below. The buffers to be read are chosen with the –b flag. 
 
FIGURE 24. Filtering logcat output based on selected buffers (20.) 
The regular format of Logcat output can be seen in figure 25 below. 
 
FIGURE 25. Standard logcat output format 
Logcat provides certain options from which the user can select the type of out-
put format for the retrieved logs.  
 
FIGURE 26. Logcat output formatting example (20.) 
In the example shown in figure 26, the output format for the logs is set as thread 
with the –v flag. 
In this output format, the output will print the severity level of the log message, 
the process ID, the thread ID and the log message itself. (20.) 
An example of this output format can be seen in figure 27 below. 
 
FIGURE 27. Logcat output format set as thread 
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4.5 Android Debug Bridge 
Android Debug Bridge (ADB) is a command-line tool that consists of three indi-
vidual components, all of which were visible in figure 13 shown earlier. 
The first of the three components of ADB is an ADB client. The ADB client is a 
program running on the host PC. The ADB client is the interface through which 
the user can interact with a target device. 
The second component is an ADB server, which is a background service run-
ning also on the host PC. The purpose of the ADB server component is to pro-
vide access to an ADB daemon service running on the target device. The ADB 
server is also responsible for managing the connections between multiple ADB 
clients and the ADB daemon running on the target device. 
The last component of the ADB communication structure is the ADB daemon. 
The ADB daemon is a service that is running on the target device. The ADB 
daemon is ultimately the one responsible for executing the commands user has 
entered through the ADB client. 
ADB can also be used to communicate with a device that is running inside an 
emulator on the host PC. 
When an ADB client is first started, the client will check if an ADB server is run-
ning on the host PC. If the ADB server is not running prior to starting the ADB 
client, the client will automatically start the ADB server process. (21.) 
When the ADB server is started, it will bind itself to a local TCP socket listening 
on port 5037. All of the ADB clients that connect to the ADB server will connect 
by using the port 5037. (21.)  
After the ADB server has started, the server will try to find running ADB dae-
mons over TCP or USB. The ADB Server is set to USB mode by default. This 
means that when the ADB server looks for the running ADB daemons, it will 
look for them initially over USB instead of over TCP. 
ADB server can be switched between USB and TCP modes. 
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In order for the ADB server to be able to connect to the ADB daemon running 
on the target device, USB debugging option must be enabled on the device. 
USB debugging can be enabled from the target device’s developer options. 
To verify that the ADB daemon of the target device is properly connected to the 
ADB server, the ADB clients can list devices that are currently connected to the 
ADB server. 
The command used by ADB clients to list the connected devices is adb devices. 
An example of the adb devices command output can be seen in figure 28. 
 
FIGURE 28. List of connected devices 
As the result of the command, the ADB server lists all of the currently connected 
devices and their unique serial numbers. 
A visual illustration of the ADB communication flow, which has been presented 
so far, can be seen in figure 29 below. 
 
FIGURE 29. ADB communication flow 
After a connection has been created between the ADB server and the target 
device’s ADB daemon, the connection can then be used by multiple ADB clients 
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to transfer data between the host and the target device and to execute various 
commands on the target device.  
One of the ways to execute commands on the target device is to create a shell 
connection to the device, as was briefly mentioned in the previous section. 
Figure 30 shows a sequence chart, which illustrates the steps taken when exe-
cuting a shell command ls on the target device. ls is a basic UNIX command 
that lists files in the current working directory. 
 
FIGURE 30. Sequence chart of shell command execution on a target device 
(22, p. 17) 
Adbd in the above figure is the ADB daemon running on the target device. 
A comprehensive list of all the different commands that can be used with ADB 
can be found from the ADB documentation. (21.) 
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5 AUDIT LOGGING FUNCTIONALITY 
The audit logging term is used to describe the functionality to be able to store a 
record of the audit events on the local device.  
This kind of audit logging functionality is not part of the original implementation 
of the Android logging system. The original logging daemon of Linux called Au-
ditd, which the Android’s logging daemon Logd is based on, provides the func-
tionality to store the logs to an external file. 
This crucial feature has been left out of the logging daemon due to strict SELi-
nux security policies set for Android. 
Auditd is the user space component of the Linux auditing system. Kauditd in 
turn is the kernel space component of the auditing system. Auditd is mainly re-
sponsible for receiving the audit events and writing them to the log files. Kauditd 
is running as a kernel process and it is responsible for handling kernel audit 
events and communicating with the auditd daemon. 
There are countless standards and requirements for multiple certifications that 
most likely require safe and uncompromised storage of the audit logs. As an 
example of the standards, which require this kind of functionality, are the Com-
mon Criteria requirements for audit logging presented in this thesis. 
A temporary buffer solution, which is used by the logging daemon, is in some 
cases insufficient to satisfy these requirements.  
This leaves the task of implementing the audit logging features to the device 
manufacturers, which are in the need of this functionality, for the sake of certifi-
cation for example. 
There are a few different approaches the device manufacturers can take to 
implement the audit logging functionality for their systems and incorporating it 
into the existing Android logging system. 
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The simplest and most logical solution would be to modify the implementation of 
the logging daemon and to add the functionality to write the logs to an external 
file. This approach however is not viable, because Android has implemented 
strict SELinux security policies that prevent the logging daemon from writing to 
files. 
The next solution would be to implement a new service that will handle the file 
writing. This will not conflict with Android’s SELinux security policies as the new 
service is separate from the logging daemon and therefor is not restricted by the 
same SELinux security policies. 
Figure 31 below demonstrates an example of how this could be implemented 
into the logging system. 
In the illusration, the logging daemons implementation is modified to send the 
logs that it receives onward through a socket or an interface to a new daemon. 
This daemon will then receive the logs and write them to an external file.  
Another possible solution would be to make a daemon that reads the log 
contents through the socket /dev/socket/logdr/ similar as to what Logcat does. 
This would remove the need to modify the functionality of the logging daemon. 
 
FIGURE 31. Audit logging functionality in the logging system 
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6 ANALYSIS OF THE SYSTEM 
This chapter contains the analysis on how the system was revised to fulfill the 
requirements set for Security Audit by the Protection Profile that was presented 
earlier in chapter 3. 
 
The chapter will cover the security requirements in the order of which they were 
analyzed and the possible modifications that were made to the system. 
 
If the analysis of the security requirements revealed that the system did not ful-
fill the set requirements, the possible modifications that were made to the com-
ponents to fulfill the requirements will be presented in some extent. In some 
cases, modifications were not made even though the requirements were not 
met. This was due the time limit of this thesis and the overall complexity of the 
component in question. 
 
In most instances it is not possible to reveal all details regarding the results of 
the analysis and the possible modifications that were made to fulfill the security 
requirements as the source code and its functionality are proprietary information 
of the company and therefore cannot be revealed to the public.  
 
When source code or small snippets of it have been included in this thesis, this 
is due to the source code being open source and therefore freely available to 
the public. When code snippets are included, the source of the snippets is in-
cluded in the references. In cases where modifications had to be made to code 
that is originally open source in nature, the details of the implementations are 
still omitted due to the proprietary nature of the modifications. 
 
6.1 Auditable Events - FAU_GEN.1.1 
The following subsections present the individual auditable events that needed to 
be recorded in order to fulfill this security requirement. 
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6.1.1 Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions – FAU_GEN.1.1 (1) 
The existing functionality of the audit functions did not include logging of its 
start-up and shutdown events. The existing functionality only logged audit 
events that it received from the Logd logging daemon. 
As this was the case, the functionality to be able to log the start-up and the 
shutdown events of the audit functionality itself had to be implemented. 
The implementation required some modifications to the existing program since 
the program originally only wrote the data it received from the logging daemon.  
The added functionality for logging of start-up and shutdown of the audit func-
tions itself is fairly simple. At the start of the audit logging program, the program 
writes the start-up event of the audit functions itself to the log records. The simi-
lar shutdown event is logged at the shutdown of the program. 
However, during the shutdown of Android the audit logging program gets killed 
with a SIGKILL termination signal. Processes killed with SIGKILL are terminated 
immediately and processes are not provided any possibility to handle the in-
coming signal or perform any kind of cleaning up procedures.  
For this reason, the logging of the shutting down event of the audit functions 
during the shutdown of Android is not possible. 
This on the other hand is not relevant, since Android shutting down is enough of 
an indication that the audit logging program is also shutting down. 
The appropriate log format also needed to be formed to fulfill the requirement 
set by FAU_GEN.1.2. The explanation of the security requirement itself and the 
log format can be found from section 6.2. 
The logs of the start-up and shutdown events can be seen in figure 32. 
 
FIGURE 32. Start-up and shutdown events of audit functions 
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6.1.2 Start-up and shutdown of Android OS – FAU_GEN.1.1 (4) 
A program called init handles the start-up of Android by starting processes nec-
essary for operation and managing them during the runtime of Android. Init also 
handles the termination of the running processes during shutdown. 
The init program is similar to the regular Linux environment init program, as the 
main purpose of the program is to handle the initialization of the system. 
Android provides system properties that indicate the current status of the sys-
tem. These properties do not exist in a standard Linux environment. 
Init checks these system properties and performs actions that have been as-
signed to be performed during certain events and based on the status of the 
system properties. 
The completion of the Android start-up is indicated by the system property 
sys.boot_completed.  
Below in figure 33 is an example of init log messages where it processes ac-
tions assigned to the aforementioned system property. These log messages 
can be used to identify the start-up of Android, as is required by the security 
requirement. 
 
FIGURE 33. Init processing actions for sys.boot_completed system property 
An example of the contents of an init configuration file and an action to be per-
formed when the sys.boot_completed system property is set can be seen in 
figure 34 below. In this example, init will stop the bootchart process that was 
started by init earlier in the boot cycle of Android. 
 
FIGURE 34. Example of an action in an init configuration file (23.) 
 46 
As for the shutting down of Android, a new implementation was not needed to 
be able to record the shutdown event either. 
The same init program also clearly indicates and sends log messages when 
Android is shutting down and when it is processing the actions assigned to the 
shutdown event of Android.  
An example of the log messages init sends during the shutdown of Android can 
be seen in figure 35. 
 
FIGURE 35. Init log messages during Android shutdown 
Init additionally handles actions assigned for a system property related to the 
shutting down of Android. The system property for monitoring shutdown re-
quests for Android is sys.shutdown.requested. Init logs the events when it pro-
cesses actions assigned to this system property. These log messages can be 
used as another indication of the shutdown of Android. 
The resulting log messages that init sends during the processing of actions as-
signed to sys.shutdown.requested system property can be seen in figure 36. 
 
FIGURE 36. Init processing action for sys.shutdown.requested system property 
As init clearly logs the events when it processes actions assigned for the sys-
tem properties regarding the start-up and shutdown of Android, no modifications 
needed to be made to fulfill the security requirement. 
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6.1.3 Start-up of the target product - FPT_TXT_EXT.2 
With Android as the core OS of the target product, the logging of the start-up of 
Android is considered to be enough indication on the start-up of the target prod-
uct and therefore no individual logging functionality was implemented for this 
security requirement. 
This was rationalized with the reasoning that Android could not possibly start 
without the target product starting first. 
The actual implementation of this feature would have been a great endeavour, 
since the audit logging functionality operates in Linux user-space. If logs were to 
be recorded from the bootloader of the target product, extensive implementation 
modifications would have been required to be able to achieve this. 
6.1.4 All administrative actions – FAU_GEN.1.1 (3) 
Administrative actions are a part of Android’s device policy management sys-
tem. The device policies can be changed by administrators, usually using some 
kind of Mobile Device Management (MDM) application. 
MDM applications are used to remotely manage and monitor the device. MDM 
applications usually provide administrators features such as configuring pass-
word policies, inspecting the contents of the device and other administration 
related features. 
The auditable events that needed to be generated in the event of an applicable 
administrative action were presented earlier in subsection 3.1.1, however this 
subsection will go into a bit more detail concerning the individual actions that 
the security requirement requires to be recorded into the audit records. 
Android provides a huge number of options to configure device policies but the 
focus of this thesis was only on the mandatory administrative actions. 
A detailed list of the policies that can be configured can be found from Android’s 
documentation. (24.) 
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The actual functionality to control and change these device policies is already a 
part of Android. The actual logging of the events, however, was not implement-
ed as a part of the original functionality. 
The security requirement defines certain events that needed to be audited from 
each of the administrative actions. Below is a list of the individual events that 
needed to be audited to fulfill the requirement. 
Configuring of password policy (7, p. 93): 
- Minimum password length 
- Minimum password complexity 
- Maximum password lifetime 
Configuring of session locking policy (7, p. 93): 
- Screen lock enabled / disabled 
- Screen lock timeout 
- Number of authentication failures 
Configuring of application installation policy (7, p. 93): 
- Restriction sources of applications 
- Denying installation of applications 
- Application whitelisting 
As the device policy manager of Android is running at the Java application level, 
it was possible to utilize the Slog class of Android to handle the logging of the 
events. The system logging class was used since the DevicePolicyManager can 
be considered a system service of Android. 
Specific log tags were created for each of the main administrative actions so 
that the individual administrative actions could easily be recognized and sepa-
rated from the other administrative actions. 
These created tags can be seen in figure 37 below. 
 
FIGURE 37. Tags for administrative action audit events 
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The majority of the time of adding the logging for the events went into looking 
through the source code of the device policy functionality, finding the functionali-
ties corresponding with the individual auditable events and then finally adding 
the logging of those events. 
Below in figure 38 is an example of functionality to set the minimum password 
length. This was one of the functionalities that had to be modified to include the 
logging of the event. 
 
FIGURE 38. Function for setting minimum password length (25.) 
The DevicePolicyManager provides functionalities for all of the individual au-
ditable events, except whitelisting applications. Since it is not implemented by 
Android, it was not possible to add logging for that event. The application white-
listing functionalities can however be provided by an MDM application for ex-
ample. 
Below in figure 39 is an example of the resulting log messages in the audit rec-
ords. The figure contains examples of the resulting log messages for each of 
the administrative actions. 
 
FIGURE 39. Auditable events visible in the audit records 
As seen in the figure, the individual administrative action log messages can 
easily be identified by the tags that were shown earlier. 
 50 
6.1.5 Insertion or removal of removal media – FAU_GEN.1.1 (5) 
The security requirement requires logging of the insertion and removal events of 
external media (7, p. 20) 
Android uses Volume Daemon (VOLD) to handle mounting and managing of 
external media such as SD cards. When an external media is inserted, VOLD 
handles the basic mounting of the partition. After that, VOLD hands the control 
over to sdcardfs to handle the final mounting procedures.  
Sdcardfs is a stackable wrapper filesystem, which is part of the Linux kernel. 
Sdcardfs handles the final mounting of the external media by mounting the me-
dia to multiple locations in the Linux filesystem using the sdcardfs filesystem.  
The mounts that occur when an external media is inserted into the device can 
be seen in figure 40 below. The sdcardfs filesystem type that is used for the 
external media is also visible in the figure. 
 
FIGURE 40. Mounting of external media 
The actual logging of the mounting and unmounting events had to be imple-
mented because a clear logging of both mounting and unmounting events did 
not exist in either VOLD or sdcardfs. 
The implementation of the logging consisted of going through VOLD’s source 
code and determining where the mounting and unmounting of the external me-
dia is handled and adding the logging of those events. 
The resulting log events that are recorded to the audit records can be seen in 
figure 41 below. 
 
FIGURE 41. Insertion and removal of external media log messages 
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6.1.6 Audit records reaching (%) of full capacity (7) 
The security requirement requires the recording of the event, in which the audit 
records reach a selected percent of the full storage capacity. (7, p. 20) 
The audit functions have a limited number of audit records that it will store. This 
is done to prevent the audit functions from filling the whole memory of the de-
vice with the audit records. After the last audit record is full, the audit functions 
will delete the oldest of the audit records and create a new one in its place. 
The actual logging of the audit records reaching a certain capacity was not in 
the existing implementation of the audit functions. 
The percent of the full capacity at which the audit functions will create an audit 
event was chosen to be at 75%. New functionality was added to log the audit 
event when the threshold is reached. 
The logging of the audit functions itself was implemented during the implemen-
tation phase regarding the security requirement about the start-up and shut-
down auditable events of the audit functions. 
As the ground work for the logging had been done earlier, the implementation of 
the logging for this security requirement was simple. The logging of the event 
was done using the previously implemented logging functionality to log events 
from the audit functions. 
The functionality to check if the set threshold has been reached had to be im-
plemented because it did not exist prior to this thesis. The functionality to check 
if the threshold has been reached checks the number of the current audit record 
file and compares it to the maximum number of audit records files. If the thresh-
old has been reached, an event will be logged into the audit records. 
The resulting log message in the audit records can be seen in figure 42 below. 
 
FIGURE 42. Audit records capacity log message   
 52 
6.1.7 Initiation of application installation or update – FMT_SMF_EXT.1 
The security requirement requires the logging of the initiation of application in-
stallation and update events. (7, p. 26) 
The requirement is a little vague however, on whether the auditable events are 
expected to be logged prior to the installation or update of the application or 
afterward. Because of this vagueness the auditable events are included for both 
initiation and the completion of the actual installation or update. 
Based on the previous experience on similar auditable events as for this thesis, 
it was known that the system already logs installation, update and uninstallation 
events of the applications. 
These events are one of the specifically defined auditable events that require 
additional information to be gathered and logged into the audit records as de-
fined by the FAU_GEN.1.2 security requirement. The additional information for 
the events was the name and version of the application that is being installed or 
updated. 
The resulting events that get logged into the audit records can be seen in figure 
43 below. 
 
FIGURE 43. Application installation / update log messages 
The additional information required by the FAU_GEN1.2 requirement can also 
be seen in the figure.  
6.1.8 Initiation or failure of self-test – FPT_TST_EXT.1 
The security requirement requires the logging of the initiation and failure events 
of the cryptographic self-tests. (7, p. 23) 
The self-testing of the cryptographic features is not yet implemented in the as-
set which this thesis was based on and therefore cannot be audited. The self-
testing will be implemented in the future along with the logging functionality. 
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6.1.9 Modifications to audit configuration – FAU_SEL.1 
The security requirement requires that all events, where modifications are made 
to the audit functionalities while they are operational, are logged in the audit 
records. (7, p. 23) 
The existing implementation of the audit functions did not provide the adminis-
trator with any way to modify the configuration of the audit functions. 
But as one of the security requirements required the functionality to alter the 
audit configuration while operational, the functionality to log the events when 
modifications are made to the audit configuration also needed to be implement-
ed into the audit functions. 
The required the functionality to alter the configuration of the audit functions is 
part of this security requirement but is covered on its own later in section 6.6. 
The implementation for the logging of the events where the audit configurations 
are modified use the same logging system that was introduced in section 6.1.1 
and was also used to fulfill the security requirement presented in section 6.1.6. 
When modifications are made to the audit configurations, the audit functions will 
log a message to the audit records, where the administrator can see that modi-
fications to the audit configurations have been made. 
The log message contains the information that the event has occurred and what 
was modified. At the time of writing, the only configurable option is the configu-
ration of the auditable events as will be presented in section 6.6. 
The resulting log messages in the audit records can be seen in figure 44 below. 
 
FIGURE 44. Audit configuration modification audit log messages 
 54 
6.1.10 Import or destruction of key – FCS_STG_EXT.1 
The security requirement requires the events, where a cryptographic key is im-
ported or destructed, to be logged, along with the identity of the key and the 
identity of the requestor of the action. (7, p. 22) 
Android uses Keystore to handle storing of cryptographic keys. Keystore pro-
vides features, such as key generation, importing of symmetric and asymmetric 
keys among other things. (26.) 
Keystore is an API for an underlying Keymaster Hardware Abstraction Layer 
(HAL). The Keymaster HAL is in turn used to communicate with Secure Ele-
ment hardware located on the device. Secure Element is a hardware based se-
cure environment which is used to carry out cryptographic operations. 
If the Secure Element does not exist on the device or it is not supported, 
Keymaster can fallback to a software-based mode and carry out the crypto-
graphic operations using OpenSSL cryptographic library. 
How Keymaster is utilized in the system and how it is used to interact with a 
Secure Element is too extensive to be covered in this thesis.  
A good research paper on different secure storage solutions and how they work 
on Android platforms can be found from the references. (27.) 
The functionality of the Keystore provided logging of the event when the keys 
are deleted but did not provide logging for the keys being imported. 
As such, the functionality of the Keystore had to be modified to include the log-
ging of the event when keys are being imported. 
The resulting log messages from the events can be seen in figure 45 below. 
 
FIGURE 45. Keystore import and delete log messages 
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6.1.11 Failure to verify integrity of stored key – FCS_STG_EXT.3 
The security requirement requires the event when an integrity check fails for a 
stored key to be logged. The security requirement required the information on 
the identity of the key to be gathered from the event. (7, p. 22) 
The key identities are specified by the security requirement to be Data Encryp-
tion Keys (DEK) and Key Encryption Keys (KEK). 
The difference between a DEK and KEK is that the DEK is used to encrypt and 
decrypt actual data. KEK is instead used to encrypt and decrypt other crypto-
graphic keys. 
KEK is usually derived from the user’s password. In most cases the DEK is en-
crypted using the KEK. This provides the possibility for the user to change 
passwords without having to encrypt all of the data over again. This is because 
the DEK can be re-encrypted again with a new derived KEK instead of creating 
a new DEK and re-encrypting all of the data with the new DEK. 
After inspecting and studying the functionality of the Keymaster HAL and the 
underlying Secure Element implementation, it became clear that the system 
does not provide complete assurance that the integrity failure is due to just the 
keyblob integrity verification failure and not due to other related errors that the 
Secure Element reports as an integrity failure. 
Keymaster will return an error code in case an operation fails in the Secure El-
ement. The integrity failure error code is used for various reasons related to the 
integrity failure in addition to the actual integrity verification failure of the key-
blob. Despite this, the integrity failure error code is used to determine the event 
in which the integrity verification fails. 
In addition, the system does not determine whether a keyblob that is being veri-
fied contains a DEK or a KEK and as such their identities cannot be known 
based solely on the keyblob itself. As the identity of the key completely depends 
on the use case of the key it is sufficient to audit the integrity check of the en-
crypted keyblob itself and disregarding the identity of the key. 
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In VOLD’s case it is known that the key that is being used for encrypting and 
decrypting of data on the /data/ partition is a DEK, as the key is used for en-
crypting and decrypting data instead of other cryptographic keys. 
VOLD handles the creation of the KEK, which is derived from the user’s pass-
word. After the KEK has been created VOLD passes the created key forward to 
TrustZone. TrustZone is responsible for handling and decrypting the DEK using 
the created KEK. The decrypted DEK is then used to encrypt and decrypt data 
on the /data/ partition. 
TrustZone is a proprietary Trusted Execution Environment by ARM and as it is a 
proprietary component, the logging of the integrity verification of the DEK is not 
possible. 
As for the Android Keystore, the keys that are being stored can either be DEK’s 
or KEK’s depending on their use. As mentioned earlier, in this case it is suffi-
cient to record the verification of the keyblob integrity without identifying the 
stored key as either a DEK or a KEK. 
Android Keystore provides functionality to double encrypt the cryptographic 
keys that are stored. In these cases, Keystore encrypts the cryptographic keys 
already encrypted by Keymaster. 
The resulting double encrypted keyblob is illustrated in figure 46 below. This 
double encryption feature provided by Keystore is completely optional. Whether 
the cryptographic keys are double encrypted or not, the actual cryptographic 
key within the keyblob will never be exposed outside of Keymaster. 
 
FIGURE 46. Double encrypted keyblob 
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Keystore uses a master-key for encrypting and decrypting the stored crypto-
graphic keys. The master-key is a randomly generated key, which is stored in 
an encrypted keyblob on the device. The key is encrypted using a KEK, which is 
derived from the user’s password. The encryption of the master-key is illustrat-
ed in figure 47 below. 
The master-key is decrypted and loaded into memory when the user unlocks 
the device with a password. When the user locks the device the decrypted mas-
ter-key is cleared from the memory. 
If the cryptographic key is only encrypted by Keymaster, the steps to encrypt 
the cryptographic key in the Keystore using the master-key are not taken. 
The removal of the encryption placed on the keyblob by the Keystore already 
contains logging of the integrity failure that might occur during the decryption. 
The integrity failure of the keyblob during the Keymaster operation however did 
not exist and had to be implemented. 
Keymaster will return an error code if the operation performed with the keyblob 
fails due to the integrity of the keyblob. This error code is checked in Keystore 
and the event is logged in the case that the failure was due to the integrity fail-
ure of the keyblob. 
 
FIGURE 47. Creation of the encrypted master-key blob 
PBKDF2, as seen in the above figure, is an algorithm that is used for deriving 
cryptographic keys out of passwords. The algorithm uses key stretching to de-
rive stronger and longer cryptographic keys out of weak and short passwords. 
AES-GCM is a symmetric key encryption algorithm that is used to encrypt the 
master-key with a key derived using the above-mentioned method.  
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6.1.12 Failure to encrypt/decrypt data – FDP_DAR_EXT.2 
The security requirement requires an audit event to be logged in the case that 
encryption or decryption of sensitive data fails. (7, p. 22) 
 
The encryption of sensitive data is separate from the normal full disk encryption 
and adds an additional layer of security for the data that is stored as sensitive 
data. The sensitive data is stored encrypted while the device is locked. When 
the device is unlocked by the user, the sensitive data is made available for use 
by providing the possibility to decrypt the data. 
 
The encryption and decryption of the sensitive data is done using Elliptic curve 
cryptography. Elliptic curve cryptography is asymmetric, similar to the more fa-
miliar RSA cryptography, where the cryptography is done using a public-private 
key pair. This is different from symmetric cryptography, where the encryption 
and decryption are done using the same secret key. One of the most known 
symmetric cryptography algorithms is AES, which was briefly mentioned before 
in the previous subsection. 
 
The sensitive data uses asymmetric encryption instead of symmetric encryption 
because the requirement states that the device should be able to encrypt data 
while the device is locked. The device is able to encrypt the data while the de-
vice is locked by using asymmetric cryptography. (7, p. 72-74) 
 
The sensitive data itself is stored in a specific directory on the device. When an 
application or a user writes data to this directory, the written sensitive data gets 
automatically encrypted. In addition to the encryption of the sensitive data itself, 
the filenames and the file paths of the sensitive data are also encrypted to pro-
vide more security and confidentiality for the sensitive data. 
 
The logging of the events when the sensitive data encryption or decryption fails 
is already implemented in the sensitive data functionality and as such, did not 
require any modifications to be made in order to fulfill the security requirement.  
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6.1.13 Addition or removal of certificate from Trust Anchor Database – 
FDP_STG_EXT.1 
The security requirement requires logging of addition and removal events for 
certificates in the Trust Anchor Database. The subject name of the certificate 
needs to be recorded in the log message. (7, p. 22) 
The Trust Anchor Database on Android is currently provided by a Java Security 
Provider called Conscrypt. 
Conscrypt offers cryptographical primitives and Transport Layer Security (TLS) 
for Java applications on Android platforms. (28.) 
More information on Conscrypt and the features it provides can be found from 
the Conscrypt GitHub page, which is listed in the references (28.) 
Trusted certificates that come with the Android system are stored in the follow-
ing location: /etc/security/.  
The amount of certificates that are currently shipped with the Android system is 
a little under 200 certificates. The amount of the certificates can vary between 
different Android versions and device manufacturers. 
The certificates that have been added by the user or an application are stored in 
/data/misc/user/n/cacerts-added/, where n indicates the id number of the user. 
The Trust Anchor Database provided by Conscrypt did not contain logging of 
the addition or removal events for the certificates. This required the logging of 
the required events to be added to the implementation. 
Below in figure 48 is an example of the resulting log messages for the addition 
and removal events of certificates in the Trust Anchor Database. 
 
FIGURE 48. Trust Anchor Database addition and removal log events 
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6.1.14 Failure to validate X.509v3 certificate – FIA_X509_EXT.1 
The security requirement requires logging of the event, in which the validation of 
an X.509v3 certificate fails. (7, p. 23) 
Android provides centralized trusted certificate storage for applications to be 
utilized. The usage of this certificate storage, however, is not enforced, and ap-
plications can choose to implement their own certificate storages and own certif-
icate validation implementations. 
Android provides standard TLS libraries that provide the functionality to validate 
the server’s certificates against the trusted certificate storage on the device. The 
application, however, might not use the standard TLS libraries and choose to 
implement its own certificate validation implementations or use other third-party 
TLS libraries. In addition to the standard TLS Android libraries, some of the 
well-known and more used third-party TLS libraries are libraries, such as 
OpenSSL and GnuTLS. 
Research has been made on the usage of various TLS libraries on Android ap-
plications. It shows that 84% of the tested applications utilize the standard An-
droid TLS libraries. The rest are spread between different OpenSSL versions 
and other unclassified third-party TLS libraries. (29.) 
 
 
FIGURE 49. TLS library TLS flows (29, Figure 2.) 
As this is the case, it is impossible to provide audit logging of the events, in 
which the certificate validation fails, and the verification is done in an application 
specific implementation or in a third-party library. 
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6.2 Audit Records Format - FAU_GEN.1.2 
The security requirement defines strict guidelines on the format in which the log 
messages are to be stored in the audit records, including what information is 
required to be recorded in the log messages. 
The information that needs to be recorded in order to fulfill the requirement: 
 Date and time of the event 
 Type of the event 
 Subject identity 
 Outcome of the event 
 Additional information in specific events 
Overview of the format of the log record can be seen in figure 50. 
 
FIGURE 50. Overview of the log record format 
A more detailed explanation of an individual log message can be seen in figure 
51. 
 
FIGURE 51. Explanation of the log message information 
The date and time of the event information is first in the log message. The date 
is recorded in a dd-mm-yyyy format and the time is recorded in a 24-hour time 
system. 
The type of the event is expressed with the severity level of the log message. In 
the case in the above figure, the severity level has been set to Error. The se-
verity levels that are recorded into the audit records: Info, Warning and Error. 
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The subject identity is expressed by an identifier, which is recorded along with 
the log message. This is sufficient to identify the source of the log message. 
The last piece of the log message is the actual outcome of the event itself and 
possible additional information, depending on the event requirements. 
The outcome of the event is not specified as to what it should be by the re-
quirement. Depending on the event, the outcome is expected to be either a 
success or a failure, or if the event cannot be evaluated to be a success or a 
failure, just a recording of the event that has occurred. 
The expression of the success or failure of an event is not defined by the re-
quirement either. Depending on the event and the source of the event, the out-
come can sometimes be a written explanation of the success or failure or simply 
a number representing a success or failure state. 
The additional information is required by the requirement in certain events but it 
is not limited to those specific events. Other events can also record additional 
information if they wish to do so. This is useful as the more information that is 
gathered from the event, the more complete picture the administrator gets of the 
whole event and what has transpired. 
The additional information has specific requirements on what needs to be rec-
orded in the case that the event is one of the specifically defined events. If the 
event is not one of those specific events, the additional information to be rec-
orded can be selected at will. 
The requirement however does not state the actual format the additional infor-
mation needs to be presented in. As there are no requirements set for the for-
mat, the format can be chosen based on the event and the information that 
needs to be recorded. 
Below in figure 52 is an example format for the additional information.  
 
FIGURE 52. Example format for the additional information 
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6.3 Audit Storage Protection – FAU_STG.1 
The security requirement requires the protection of the stored audit records 
from unauthorized deletion and modification. (7, p. 27) 
These requirements are met as the Linux operating system provides an exten-
sive access control system for individual files and directories. 
When the audit records are created, the permissions for the files are set as 
such that only the program as the owner of the file and the root user are allowed 
to modify the contents of the audit records. 
The permissions are indicated in three pairs of three letters: RWX, where they 
indicate the read, write and execute permissions respectively. 
The first letter of the permissions string can be used to indicate the type of the 
file. There are multiple of different letters indicating different types of files. If the 
file is a regular file, the letter is replaced with a dash. 
The first pair of three letters is used to indicate the permissions that the owner 
of the file has over the file. As can be seen in figure 53 below, only the owner of 
the file has been granted read and write permissions for the file. No execution 
permissions have been granted since the file is a normal text file and cannot be 
executed. 
The next pair after the owner’s permissions are the permissions that a user 
group has over the file. The last pair are the permissions that other users have 
over the file.  
 
FIGURE 53. Audit records access permissions 
The audit records are also protected by strict SELinux policies. 
By properly utilizing the access control systems of Linux and SELinux, the ac-
cess control systems take care of the protection of the audit records and pre-
vent unauthorized modifications of the audit records. 
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6.4 Prevention of Audit Data Loss – FAU_STG.4 
The security requirement requires that the audit functionalities overwrite the 
oldest audit record in the case that the maximum capacity is reached. (7, p. 27) 
As was previously mentioned in subsection 6.1.6, the audit records have a set 
maximum capacity to prevent the audit records from filling up the entire internal 
memory of the device. 
As was also briefly mentioned in subsection 6.1.6, the current implementation of 
the audit functions provides functionality to remove the oldest audit record when 
the maximum capacity is reached. After the oldest record has been deleted, a 
new audit record will be created in its place. 
This kind of functionality enables the audit functions to keep operating practical-
ly infinitely, only replacing the oldest audit record when necessary. 
As the implementation is already in place, fulfilling the security requirement, no 
changes needed to be made to the functionality. 
6.5 Audit Review – FAU_SAR.1 
The security requirement requires that the audit functions must be able to pro-
vide the capability to read the record contents and provide them in a manner 
suitable for the administrator to interpret. (7, p. 145) 
The requirement is first of the requirements that were decided to be included, 
even though these are completely optional at the time. 
The current implementation of the audit functions provide functionality to trans-
fer the audit records via an interface through which the audit records can be 
sent onward to, for example, an MDM server, where the audit records can be 
viewed and interpreted by the administrator. 
The audit events in the audit records are also recorded in a simple format to 
help the administrator interpret the contents of the audit records. This can be 
seen in the figures shown in the previously analyzed auditable events subsec-
tions. 
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6.6 Selective Audit – FAU_SEL.1 
The security requirement requires that the audit functions must be able to pro-
vide the administrator a possibility to select a set of events to be audited from all 
of the auditable events. (7, p. 145) 
This is the second and final of the optional security requirements that were de-
cided to be included.  
The requirement provides a selection of parameters based on which the audita-
ble events can be filtered. The list of the parameters that could be selected was 
shown earlier in section 3.5. 
From the list of possible parameters, the event type was chosen as the only 
configurable parameter. This was because the event type was thought of being 
the most descriptive of the parameters and to simplify the implementation of the 
selection functionality. 
This kind of selection was not originally implemented in the audit functions and 
it needed to be implemented in order to fulfill the security requirement. 
The implemented functionality to select the events to be audited based on the 
type of the event is provided via the same interface as the one that was men-
tioned in the previous subsection, which presented the analysis of the audit re-
view security requirement. 
The administrator can configure the event types that the audit functionalities 
record through the aforementioned interface. The audit functions will then com-
pare the audit messages it receives and stores them in the audit records de-
pending if the event type matches the ones defined by the administrator. 
The event types were defined by the FAU_GEN.1.2 security requirement, which 
was presented earlier in subsection 3.1.2. 
As the administrator is provided the functionality to select the events to be au-
dited based on the event type, the security requirement is fulfilled. 
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7 CONCLUSION 
The main aim of this thesis was to familiarize myself with the requirements set 
for Security Audit by the Common Criteria Mobile Device Fundamentals Protec-
tion Profile and to analyze the current situation of the system and how it in its 
current state fulfilled these requirements. In addition to this, the secondary aim 
was to add the functionality to fulfill the security requirements where the system 
did not meet the requirements. 
To achieve these aims, I had to familiarize myself with the logging system of 
Android, which has been implemented for logging messages. The whole logging 
system was presented in detail, simplifying certain aspects of it when necessary 
to help the reader get a better overall understanding of the system. 
The final phase of this thesis was the actual analysis of the system itself. To my 
surprise quite a few modifications had to be made to the system to be able to 
fulfill the security requirements. A majority of these modifications were made to 
Android components and only a small portion to the proprietary components of 
the company. 
It is surprising that Android implementations have not been made more compat-
ible with some of these more common certification requirements, such as the 
ones presented in this thesis. Instead, Android leaves the modification up to the 
device manufacturers. This is, of course, not always the case as Android also 
provides many features to comply with certain, usually larger scale require-
ments. 
Nevertheless, the aims for this thesis were met, the system was analyzed and 
modifications to comply with the security requirements were made where it was 
convenient and possible without larger modifications of the components. 
In the cases where the system did not meet the requirements and the modifica-
tions could not be made at the current time in order to conform to the require-
ments, they were highlighted and will be resolved as necessary at some time in 
the future outside of the scope of this thesis. 
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